Introduction
Explanation for Ireland's impressive economic performance in the 1990s, continuing though at a lower level into the 2000s, has often been presented as if it were mainly a matter of sorting out the technical economic issues. The outcomes of rebalancing the public finances, or freeing economic incentives through tax liberalization, or ensuring appropriate tax incentives to attract mobile inward capital investment, have attracted most attention; so also have 'lucky' factors such as the availability of a ready supply of skilled labour at reasonable costs (Barry 1999; . Indeed, given these conditions, some observers have held that there is nothing particularly unusual in the Irish experience, and that getting the economic fundamentals right was bound to produce just the sort of 'catch-up' growth we have actually seen (Honohan and Walsh 2002) .
But the political alignments that make such policy decisions possible can tend to be overlooked. What governments actually do requires us to think about the issues that arise at the margins of political and economic analysis, for policy making is rarely a matter of simply identifying the most technically appropriate solutions and implementing them. The steps involved include the process of choosing which among an array of policies to adopt, assessing how this interacts with policy commitments in other areas, and building enough agreement with those involved in their implementation to ensure that they will work as intended. Policy making involves interplay between the political authorities -government, public administration -and various organized interests, the outcome of which is uncertain. Political scientists have noted that the institutional framework -the legal structures and established policy routines -create their own incentives for the way in which actors seek to advance their interests and the way in which they relate to one another (March and Olsen 1984; Hall and Taylor 1996) . But the way relationships between state officials and economic actors take shape may vary across policy sectors, for 'states are not unitary or monolithic structure. They are organizational complexes whose "parts" represent different ages, functions, and orientations' (Weiss 1998, p.15) . We cannot generalize about what the state can do overall, but about the competences of different parts of the state's activities. How the governance mechanisms work in each policy area is a matter that must be empirically investigated. And whether or not the parts work effectively together is not guaranteed in advance.
A comparative framework can guide our discussion. In many respects Ireland in the 1990s has been a model of economic liberalism, where market-conforming policies in the areas such as taxation, labour market, and regulatory policy, have been in evidence. A consistent industrial policy stance facilitated strong FDI-led growth and an associated modernization of the rest of the economic structure and upgrading of the employment structure (O'Connell 2000; O'Connell and Russell 2007; Barry et al. 1999 ). But in some respects its economic governance arrangements -the ways in which these policies have been arrived at -have been quite unusual. The activist role of industrial policy is one such example; so too is the significant role that social partnership came to play not only in pay determination, but also in the distinctive position it occupies in relation to labour market policy and social welfare issues. This makes Ireland's mode of economic governance particularly interesting, and the puzzles of how new solutions were found to new adaptive challenges, and what the costs and benefits have been, merit some attention.
Economic governance is understood here to mean the way in which political officials (government ministers, the civil service, and the state agencies) engage with organized interests (chiefly the trade union and employers' representative organizations). We need to understand how the actors relate to one another in a particular institutional context that shapes the way they interact, and a particular framework of policy inherited from the past that constrains the options available to them in their current choices. And finally, it may well be relevant to know something about the way they saw the world, the values and priorities they held, the political discourse that captured their outlook Our concern, therefore, is with institutions, actors, and ideas (or as some have termed it, polity, policy and politics -the framework of interactions, the dynamics of engagement between actors, and the undetermined outcome of their mutual engagements that are shaped by the ideas or discourse that is most meaningful to them (Treib et al. 2005; Blyth 1997; Schmidt 2000; Schmidt 2002 ).
Institutional clusters and elective affinities
The scope of what is encompassed by economic activity is in principle broad.
Virtually every aspect of public policy has an economic dimension: education policy, for example, is crucial to shaping the supply of appropriate skills and knowledge in the labour force; transport and communications infrastructure are vital to economic efficiency; even cultural policy may be said to have an economic dimension insofar as cultural outputs may be seen as traded and exported goods.
We can outline three broad policy areas, apart from core macroeconomic policy making, which are vital for the overall profile of economic performance. The first is the politics of production, in particular industrial policy. The second is the wagesetting aspects of industrial relations. The third might be identified as the politics of distribution: income maintenance and welfare services. Within each of the areas, we might find variations in the way policy making is organized, depending on the degree of political centralization of power over an issue area, and the capacity of organized interests to coordinate and act collectively in their interactions with government.
Yet none of these is hermetically sealed from the others; and we have seen important changes in policy-making happening both within each of these and across them, linking them in new ways. There are constraints on what can be done in one policy area, as this will have spillover effects on other areas. These have been analysed in terms of institutional complementarities. In explaining differences in the way production processes are organized across countries, it has been noted that the feedback effect from good performance in one policy area makes it more likely that a complementary policy choice will be made in a related policy area (Soskice 1999 ).
These reinforcing dynamics help explain why, for example, German capitalism has been resistant to dismantling its long-term funding relationships between banks and firms, and why employers remain broadly committed to industry-level pay bargaining and the distinctive vocational training system (Thelen 2000) .
A similar point can be made more generally about links across policy sectors. As Ebbinghaus notes, policy choices across distinct issues such as industrial policy, pay bargaining and industrial relations, and welfare state provision, are likely to display 'elective affinities' -incentives and constraints mean that measures put in place in one policy arena will tend to complement those that are important in others (Ebbinghaus 1998 Small open economies, it is argued, experience a strong incentive to organize domestically in response to international economic fluctuations. They 'complemented their pursuit of liberalism in the international economy with a strategy of domestic compensation' (Katzenstein 1985, p.47) . They found ways of inserting themselves effectively into international trade with a successful industrial policy. Meanwhile, domestic producers and consumers were likely to find that greater exposure to the world economy entailed new kinds of economic vulnerability. So states are subject to electoral demands for new domestic interventions, both to assist indigenous industry and to support living standards through transfer payments. These pressures are likely to come most strongly from those at greatest risk of having their livelihood disrupted Rather less attention has been paid to the economic adjustment problems that might face a small, open economy that falls into the cluster of 'liberal market economies'.
Liberal market economies are chiefly the English-speaking countries, which shared a tradition of common law and a commitment to market liberalism. These economies have typically relied more strongly on financial markets to fund industrial investment, and never had the strong, long-term linkages between financial and industrial capital characteristic of the more coordinated economies. Their models of wage bargaining tended to feature a more fragmented pattern and more market-conforming outcomes than among coordinated countries. And their welfare provisions tend to be less generous, more geared toward safety-net provision. Ireland, with its institutional and policy legacies derived from the British model, falls into this cluster in many respects.
But industrial policy, industrial relations and its related issues, and welfare state policy, do not exist in an institutional vacuum: the overall framework is the authoritative decision-making by government. States have a vital role to play in mediating the effects of changes in the international economy (Evans 1995; Schmidt 1995) . Even if there are many constraints on their options, there is still considerable latitude in the choices states make in the combination of policies promoting equity and efficiency (Ganghof 2000; Garrett 2000; Hall 1999; Pontusson 2005) . The threat of capital disinvestment has not foreclosed the possibility of policy choice. Indeed, evidence shows that investors care less about the volume of spending than about the size of the debt required to fund it, and are prepared to accommodate to a variety of party possibilities in government (Mosley 2003; Swank 2002) . There is no evidence of a convergence of states' adaptive responses around the liberal, market-led model.
There is still considerable variation in the patterns countries display in their policy choices.
The Irish experience is of particular interest in these debates. Whether we look at industrial policy, at pay determination and industrial relations, or at welfare state policies, policy choices no not fit easily into either of the two clusters outlined above.
The institutional and legal structure of Irish business is based on the liberal model: ownership structures, industrial funding, and market flotation, are very similar to those seen in Britain and the USA. The industrial relations system is voluntarist in style, consistent with its inheritance from the British system, and not highly embedded in legally binding rights and duties as is the case in Continental European systems.
The welfare state developed from its origins in British social protection schemes, and shares many affinities with it in its core reliance on means-tested and targeted programmes.
However, patterns of Irish economic governance have departed from the British model in some respects. We find that the directions taken often correspond to the kind of adjustment said to be typical of small open economies. Ireland's institutional and policy inheritance, the way different policy sectors were organized administratively, the structure and preferences of the main economic actors, and the nature of the linkages between organized interests and government, place it as an interesting variant on the liberal market type (Hardiman 2002b (Hardiman , 2005 . 
Continuity and change: adjustment under pressure
The broad contours of Ireland's recent economic history are relatively uncontentious and are often seen in three phases. From the late 1950s until the early1970s, the move away from protectionism saw the first sustained growth spell for several decades. This took place against the backdrop of conservative fiscal policy and a monetary policy that was constrained by the maintenance until 1979 of parity with sterling of the Irish pound (Kennedy et al. 1988) . A second phase of recurrent crises and crisis management begins with the international oil crisis in 1973, which coincided with Ireland's accession to EEC membership. Increased exposure to the international economy proved devastating for many indigenous firms, but also saw a heightened inflow of foreign investment. Fiscal mistakes in the late 1970s intensified the effects of the subsequent international downturn -a more active fiscal policy had resulted in strong pro-cyclical impulses that proved difficult to curb (Honohan 1999) . Attempts at fiscal stabilization during the 1980s were bedevilled by internal coalition tensions and constrained by recessionary conditions; high unemployment, steady emigration, and persistently high public debt created a sense of mounting crisis.
The late 1980s mark the start of a third phase. The eventual establishment of a party political consensus over macroeconomic priorities made it possible to curb spending and achieve fiscal stabilization. 'Jobless growth' seemed to be the country's fate for several years more. The latter half of the 1990s, though, were years of economic boom, with very rapid growth translating for the first time into virtually full employment, despite a rapid expansion of the labour force. Economic performance in the 2000s proved bumpier following the end of the US-led boom. By this time, the tools of macroeconomic management had become more tightly constrained: membership of the Euro currency zone reduced whatever scope had previously existed for selective exchange rate changes, or interest rate adjustments, to manage domestic performance. The burden of adjustment was thrown more forcefully onto fiscal policy on the one hand, and domestic cost management on the other. Ireland had by this point attained the unexpected status of being among the wealthiest of the OECD member countries (FitzGerald 2000; Nolan and Maitre 2007) . It had yet to deal with serious recession in the new policy environment.
These are the broad outlines of the story. Within these broad parameters we see parallel adjustments taking place in discrete policy sectors. But the scope and reach of the state proved to be different in each. The manner in which policy change occurred was subject to rather different imperatives in industrial policy, pay policy and industrial relations, and welfare state development. In each of these cases we can see that growing economic openness and social vulnerability created pressures for policy adjustments. But not only do we see changes in policy content within established routines of doing things, we also see some changes taking place in governance mechanisms themselves. What shifts in policy clusters underlay these developments?
Industrial development
The move from protectionism toward free trade involved adoption of an increasingly active industrial policy. In the 1950s, about half Ireland's workforce was engaged in relatively low-yielding agricultural activities. By the 2000s agriculture employed fewer than 8% of the workforce, internationally traded services were booming, and foreign-owned firms accounted for about three-quarters of the value of all exports.
There is an element of luck in this: a low corporation tax regime and a consistent policy stance on foreign direct investment were in place for several decades before they yielded the transformative changes of the 1990s. Nevertheless, the modern Industrial Development Authority (IDA) has been identified as the key activist institution in making these industrial policy priorities effective, with a great deal of operational autonomy from the civil service proper. Ó Riain has gone so far as to identify Ireland's activist industrial policy mix with the 'developmental' states of East Asia -though in this case, prioritising market incentives and working through looser networks rather than depending on dirigiste or protectionist state agencies (Ó Riain 2004).
There was nothing obvious about this though. The first steps toward raising the growth potential of the Irish economy, as protective tariffs were dismantled, were intended to be taken by increasing agricultural production and exports. The IDA, first established in 1949, initially functioned very much on the margins of domestic industrial activity. State sponsorship of industrial development continued to predominate in official thinking, principally due to the leading position occupied by Seán Lemass, who held key ministerial roles overseeing industrial development in the 1930s and 1940s, as well as the role of Taoiseach in the early 1960s (Daly 1992 ).
Protected domestic industry was recognized to be vulnerable; the turn toward free trade was accompanied by a range of initiatives to assist indigenous industry. In classic 'small open economy' mode, new bodies were set up to help firms, most of which were quite small-scale, to become more cost-effective, to acquire marketing skills, to engage more actively in exporting -principally, at this time, to the British market. And new consultative and advisory bodies were established to engage employers and unions in improved exchanges of information, the better to foster a climate of effective industrial adaptation. Some tax incentives already existed to encourage manufacturing exports. In time, these became the central element of the policy of attracting new inward investment, but they were not initially conceived for this purpose.
However, neither state commercial bodies nor the existing industrial sector proved equal to the task of driving the expansion of indigenous industry. The parallel initiatives to encourage the domestic private sector producers to rationalize and become more export-oriented proved rather disappointing -inputs of information or marketing skills alone did not prove sufficient to upgrade domestic production and innovation systems (Mjoset 1992) . It was this recognition that occasioned the major reorganization of the IDA in 1969, through which it acquired much greater operational autonomy and began to focus more deliberately on seeking foreign sources of industrial investment capital. This gave industrial policy a head-start in taking advantage of EEC membership from 1973. The consequences were doubleedged: much of indigenous industry was still poorly adapted to compete effectively.
The newly developing modern, competitive, export-oriented sector was almost entirely made up of foreign-owned, especially US firms that were keen to gain a foothold in European markets, attracted by tax incentives and a relatively low cost base, and interested in working in an English-language environment. Ó Riain notes that major reviews of the functioning of the IDA, resulting in changes to its structure and functioning, were precipitated by the need to find convincing 
Pay and work
Wage-setting and industrial relations in Ireland have been governed by a much more direct interplay of government intervention and market allocation mechanisms than we have seen in the case in industrial policy. The fragmented trade union movement, the low level of industrial development, the small scale of indigenous industry during the1960s would suggest that market mechanisms would prevail in wage-setting.
However, against this one might posit two other sorts of pressures. The first is the logic of coordination facing the small open economy, which is a price-taker on world markets, and in which unemployment functions as a discipline on failure to achieve cost-based adjustments, at any rate in the absence of exchange rate flexibility. This would suggest that there might be an incentive, particularly for trade unions, to attempt some restructuring or at least coordination of bargaining activity (Olson 1971; Calmfors and Driffill 1988; Crouch 2000) . The second is the institutional and policy inheritance of protectionism itself. This gave government -especially, as we have seen, Seán Lemass in his various ministerial and prime ministerial roles -a strong role in trying to shape domestic actors' responses to the development initiatives. The long dominance of Fianna Fáil in power gave it some advantage here. So too did its more general successes in creating and recreating durable cross-class coalitions of support throughout changes in policy orientation, grounded in a broad nationalist ideology (Bew et al. 1989 ). The changes that took place in pay bargaining were driven in part by the trade union leadership itself, as key union leaders within the Irish Congress of Trade Unions sought to strengthen procedural norms governing disputes and picketing. And leaders of the largest unions were also behind the move toward regularizing wage rounds in a series of formal National Wage Agreements, which persisted throughout the 1970s.
These were also Irish-based unions that were more sympathetic to working with government and were less strongly wedded to traditions of workplace militancy favoured by British-based unions. But there was a large element of sanction involved too -the 'shadow of the state', as Sharpf has termed it, which need not be actively implemented to achieve the desired effect (Scharpf 2000) . New legislation governing industrial relations was introduced in 1969, and the first pay agreement in 1970 was concluded in the context of government proposals to introduce a statutory pay deal for the public service.
This series of pay agreements depended on voluntary compliance and recourse to the monitoring institutions, which included a new set of employer-labour organizations as well as a new role for the statutory labour relations machinery. But within the new framework, the powerful impetus toward local fragmented bargaining persisted. In the context of mounting fiscal crisis in the early 1980s, the employers finally put an end to the process.
In these circumstances, one of the possibilities for government might be to conclude that pay coordination had failed, and that market-driven adjustment was the logical alternative. In a system featuring strong union organization but little centralization or coordination, the options for improving aggregate outcomes might be to drive the level of bargaining down to workplace level, to oblige bargaining outcomes to respond directly to firm-level conditions. This was, in effect, the strategy adopted by provided by the partnership agreements (Hardiman 2002a) . Growth thus translated more readily into employment creation in the latter half of the 1990s. Along with the Netherlands, Denmark, and Norway, Ireland's performance far outstripped that of the more deregulated labour markets of the UK, New Zealand, and Australia (Schwartz 1994 (Schwartz , 2000b (Schwartz , 2000a Auer 2000) . The OECD commented on Ireland's 'peerless performance' that made it 'a world leader in a number of aspects of economic performance' (OECD 1999).
The negotiated governance of pay continued to be managed through voluntarist agreements. The network of institutional supports was now stronger and more firmly embedded than previously. Moreover, the complex network of working groups and special initiatives that grew out of partnership processes meant that an ever-broader range of issues came under the ambit of partnership. Labour market issues had long been central. These were defined increasingly widely to include aspects of child care provision, education and housing issues, and many others.
In effect, social partnership grew beyond labour market issues to become a new form of network governance, offering privileged access not only to the organized economic interests but also to broader voluntary sector organizations. Rhodes argued about British network governance that wrote that 'Networks are not accountable to the state: they are self-organizing' (Rhodes 2000, p.61) . But the negotiating and policy networks connected to social partnership were rather different. Social partnership in Ireland depends on political sponsorship; the Department of the Taoiseach is the institutional locus for coordinating initiatives to renew it, at approximately three-year intervals. There is little indication that scope would exist for the kind of autonomous bipartite employer-labour agreements evident elsewhere, at national level in the Netherlands, or industry agreements in Sweden or indeed Germany (Traxler 2000) .
The key actors in supporting Irish social partnership are indigenous manufacturing and the public sector. Union organization is low, and often unrecognised, in the large and growing foreign high-tech manufacturing sector, and in the high-value traded services sector that has grown up around the tax and other incentives provided to the Irish Financial Services Centre (IFSC) in Dublin. These sectors broadly followed the centrally negotiated pay norms, but retained the right to adjust their own wage rates more flexibly, especially through the use of bonuses and fringe benefits.
The Irish economy therefore had many of the features of market-related flexible cost adjustment, combined with coordinated management of costs in the most politically sensitive sectors such as the public service. But this in effect increases the lobbying power of insider interests -and in any system where public service workers bulk large in wage agreements, their interests may well diverge from those of the cost-sensitive traded sectors (Garrett and Way 1999) Indeed, by the mid-2000s, concerns were widely expressed at the loss of competitiveness, rising cost base, and inflation levels above the EU average (OECD 2007).
Social partnership may be seen as a new mode of economic governance, but one which remained bounded by discretionary government decision-making. Social partnership was valued mainly by its contribution to improved economic performance, or 'output legitimacy'. Nevertheless, it also became a core part of the broader consultative apparatus of policy making. The processes fell outside the framework of representative government, and the degree to which they could speak for the whole of their constituency remained contested. After all, the unions heavily over-represented public sector employment, and had a much slighter presence in the high-tech sector in which trade union organization was not permitted. Nevertheless, the right to have a voice had become more broadly accepted. Social partnership had acquired a much stronger 'input legitimacy' than before. Government accepted this on the grounds, as a senior civil servant close to the partnership process noted, Social partnership is about the alignment of agendas. It is not about bargaining, but about figuring what policy choices are available. If anything, it is a privileged relationship with government for the social partners. The wider policy agenda is driven by what government wants to achieve, tempered by an understanding of what is feasible; it thus provides an important opportunity for a wide range of interests to influence government thinking. (Hardiman 2006) .
Social partnership has created a nexus of consultative and participatory relationships with government which embed organized interests in the political process more firmly than the model of liberal market economies might suggest, and more centrally than is apparent in Britain, for example. The significance of these policy channels waxes and wanes. Where policy alternatives are clear -on taxation, for example -government discretion ultimately prevails. But social partnership has come to structure the public space more extensively than could have been anticipated when attempts at formal pay agreements first started in 1970.
Welfare provisions
Welfare state provision developed rapidly in Ireland from the early 1970s on, starting from a relatively low base in comparative European terms. While much of the growth in spending at this time was driven by cyclical factors -especially the rise in unemployment -broadened entitlements and new programme entitlements also played an important part. The structure of the welfare state is complex, due to its dual inheritance from British social legislation in the early 20 th century, and the important role of church organizations in providing services which came increasingly to be funded by the state, though without altering structures of ownership and management, especially in health care and education. And while a significant Catholic social services sector would not be uncommon in continental Europe, its scale in Ireland, and the funding arrangements which make it both the public as well as the religious option, makes it quite distinctive if not indeed unique.
The result is that the Irish welfare state proves difficult to classify in comparative terms. In shares with the liberal or Anglo-American model of welfare state a reliance on minimal provision and means-testing, and a relative low level of service provision (Esping-Andersen 1990) . But some indicators point in other directions, such as the floor-raising uprating of means-tested benefits in response to long-term unemployment in the early 1990s, or the strong familial emphasis in the structure of tax liabilities and welfare payments (Cousins 1997) .
Identifying the incidence of poverty is contentious and depends heavily on definitions and measurements, though material wellbeing has varied greatly with phases in economic performance. If the most restrictive and least contentious definitions of poverty concern 'acute deprivation', that is, material or lifestyle deprivations combined with income poverty, then the trend shows a distinct improvement and fell from almost 15 per cent in 1994 to under 5 per cent in 2001 (Nolan et al. 2002; Whelan et al. 2007) . And while relative income inequality had certainly increased during the growth years, this was due in large measure to market factors to do with the changing profile of the labour force and the composition of employment, rather than changes in the profile of welfare provision itself .
Income supports and welfare issues have become more central to social partnership policy discussions. But priority-setting and decision-making remain firmly under government control. Yet at the same time, and despite considerable growth in public spending, government's direct control over the modes of service delivery continued to be more attenuated in Ireland than in many other systems. Problems of capacity and responsiveness therefore led to a growth in reliance on privately funded services.
The Irish trade union movement was able to achieve greater coordination in interest representation in the face of economic crisis, and to forge a new consensus around the negotiation of national-level framework pay agreements. But this did not necessarily extend to a strong commitment to the 'social wage' whereby improvements in social services or welfare provision would be seen as directly offsetting pay claims. Rather, the pay-tax agenda was pursued as the core part of each pay agreement throughout the period of social partnership. The networks of social partnership working groups allowed union movement and the voluntary sector organizations voice on a range of welfare issues. But these transferred only intermittently into the core policy processes of public administration, and the issues taken up were dictated more by government electoral priorities than by the social partnership process itself.
The party political system is not usually thought to reflect class differences well, yet both the major parties and any potential coalition groupings have an incentive to maximize their support among the broadest support base possible. This has been seen as leading to a 'politics of the median voter', rather than facilitating strong support for an egalitarian or redistributive or universalist set of preferences (Hardiman 1998 religiously-run secondary schools, in the community and comprehensive sector, which became more common from the 1970s on, did not result in a new public education sector, but rather introduced a new type of hybrid management system between public and private interests (O Buachalla 1988) . The sharp decline in religious staff, the drop in church attendances during the 1990s, and the growing diversity of the Irish population put growing pressure on the system of strong reliance on denominational ownership and control of educational facilities. Some changes in the structure of Boards of Management during the 1990s increased public participation and accountability, but the governance of education continue to be structured along the historically established and largely denominationally owned and managed lines. Among the legacies of this was a 'private' fee-paying sector in which fees functioned as a top-up on public funding; but also a pattern of per capita public spending per pupil, at both primary and secondary levels, considerably below OECD averages.
The governance of health care involved a similarly complex mix of provision through public funding, some publicly owned hospitals, and networks of private service providers. The 19 th century two-tier dispensary system remained in place much longer in Ireland than in Britain and was only finally abolished in 1970. The income thresholds for full free medical entitlements (through medical card entitlement) remained very low; despite some limited universal entitlements for some categories.
Self-employed professionals in health care continued to have a prominent place in the overall pattern of provision that was not fundamentally challenged by the expansion of entitlements. The pivotal role of hospital consultants, brought into question from time to time, was never fundamentally challenged. Their continued prominence in the system gave them an important veto player role in any future planning of acute services (Barrington 2003; Immergut 1992) . Primary care expansion came about through contracting with self-employed GPs through per-capita payments to treat medical card holders, resulting in a fragmentation of primary care.
The strong inheritance of the intermingling of public and private, as noted above, creates a bias or barrier against consideration of universal provision or prioritising egalitarian priorities in welfare provision. As a senior civil servant commented,
In Ireland, the middle classes are expected to look after themselves. For a long time they were excluded from Social Insurance schemes; they are encouraged to take out private health insurance, pensions and so on. (Hardiman 2006) .
And yet the extent to which public funding subsidizes private provision is often overlooked. The increase in public spending and the expansion of entitlements overlaid many of the institutional patterns laid down in an earlier age.
Conclusion
The coordination of policy commitments across the principal domains of economic management was does not necessarily produce functional outcomes. Each of the policy domains relating to overall economic performance is subject to a different structure of institutionalized policy making and implementation.
In a broader context, though, policy adaptation across different domains in Ireland can be understood as a response to two different imperatives, not necessarily complementary to one another, but where the scope for adaptation is strongly institutionally bounded. On the one hand, Ireland's growth strategy from the late 1950s on was based on facilitating inward investment through a low corporation tax regime, and the maintenance of relatively low levels of labour force regulation. This strengthened a variant of liberal market economy institutions and practices. New industrial investment was energetically courted by an activist state agency, and as a host FDI country, complementary public investments were made, especially in the expansion of third-level education. But the profile of educational training and the supply of labour were weakly coordinated with industry or employer preferences, relying rather on market signals to induce appropriate responses.
On the other hand, industrial relations policy circled repeatedly round attempts to achieve better coordination among bargaining groups, the better to improve aggregate performance in growth, inflation, strikes, and job creation. These initiatives were more akin to the adjustment strategies of other small open economies with strong interest representation than to the politics of liberal economies relying on market disciplines to bring union demands into line. Social partnership institutions set up a panoply of extra-parliamentary influences that came to be an effective vehicle for putting a very wide range of concerns onto the political agenda. Government may or may not take these up, and insisted on its democratic mandate to put electoral accountability above interest group demands. But the privileged access afforded to the broad array of organized interests provided a strong and flexible mode of raising and keeping issues on the political agenda. And for trade union members, the tradeoff in social partnership processes was more strongly based on the individualistic logic of tax cuts than on a solidaristic commitment to improving the social wage.
But the different logics at work in governing the economy need not lead to optimal or even complementary outcomes. Wage-setting policy has been based strongly on the public sector and the better-organized manufacturing sector; foreign-owned high-tech firms followed suit during the 1990s once their own circumstances warranted it; and most of the sizeable private services sector, increasing sections of which are now internationally traded, is not covered by pay deals at all. But the strong political commitment to wage coordination may be vulnerable to the preferences of labour market insiders and especially to the pressure that can be exerted by public sector employees. Public sector pay is not clearly benchmarked against market-based comparators. Not only does this drive up the cost of providing public services, it risks pushing up the cost base of production and a deterioration in competitiveness, both of which would be inimical to overall growth priorities.
But while a political commitment to social partnership is somewhat at odds with the underlying structural features of a liberal market economy, the scope of pay coordination deals is constrained by precisely these deep institutional features of the economy. Employers have resisted both broadening and deepening the reach of partnership processes. They have accepted the introduction of a minimum wage, for example, and have supported institutionalized processes over union recognition. But they have opposed union proposals to strengthen union recognition rights, for example, or a stronger workplace presence in works councils. And despite the range of topics under discussion in partnership structures, unions have found it impossible to make welfare state or income maintenance issues central to the pay deals themselves.
The kind of response a country will adopt to changes in the international economic context will be shaped by the interplay of domestic institutions and the organized interests working through them. Institutional innovation will be disciplined and constrained by market pressures. Contrary to the common wisdom that 'you can't buck the markets', it is entirely possible to do so, up to a piont; but whether it is done wisely or not can take some time to find out.
